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GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF CONDOMINIUM 
CONVERSION 
Robert M. Schlein* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The condominium form of ownership, 1 virtually unknown in the 
United States twenty years ago,' has become an important seg-
• Sta1f Member, BOSTON" COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
'One definition of "condominium" is found in the California condominium statute. 
A condominium is an estate in real property consisting of an undivided interest in 
common in a portion of a parcel of real property together with a separate interest in 
space in a residential, industrial or commercial building on such real property, such as an 
apartment, office or store. A condominium may include in addition a separate interest in 
other portions of such real property. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 783 (West Supp. 1979). "Condominium" may also be defined in a specifi-
cally residential context as: 
Individual ownership in fee simple of a one-family unit in a multifamily structure cou-
pled with ownership of an undivided interest in the land and in all other parts of the 
structure held in common with all of the other owners of one-family units. 
RAMSEY, CONDOMINIUM: THE NEW LooK IN CO-OPS 3 (1961) quoted in Cribbet, Condomin-
ium-Home Ownership for Megalopolis?, 61 MICH. L. REv. 1207, 1209 (1963). This article 
uses "condominium" to represent a form of real estate ownership characterized by the in-
separable combination of two distinct property interests: the individual ownership of dwell-
ing space coupled with an undivided interest in common areas. "Unit" will refer only to the 
dwelling space owned in fee simple. 
This article does not specifically deal with cooperatives, where a building is owned by a 
corporation whose shareholders are the residents of the building. These shareholders lease 
their apartments from the corporation and pay rent calculated to maintain the building. 
Condominium ownership offers greater financial flexibility for residents and for lending in-
stitutions because each unit may be mortgaged separately. 
• Puerto Rico passed the first condominium enabling statute in the United States in 1951. 
A more sophisticated Horizontal Property Act was enacted in 1958. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, 
§§ 1291-1293k (1968). F.H.A. mortgage insurance was made available for condominiums in 
1961. Housing Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-70, § 104, 75 Stat. 160 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
919 
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ment of the residential real estate market.3 All fifty states now 
have condominium statutes prescribing procedures for establishing 
and maintaining condominium developments.· For many persons 
seeking shelter, condominiums combine the best features of apart-
ment living and home ownership. 
Condominiums may be established in new, suburban construc-
tion, with clusters of townhouse units situated on large tracts of 
land with common facilities, including swimming pools and health 
clubs. New high-rise construction also accomodates this form of 
ownership in the city and the suburbs. In addition, rental apart-
ments in existing buildings can be sold as condominiums, with the 
apartment/unit owners receiving undivided interests in common 
areas and facilities and managing the building though an associa-
tion. The sale of rental apartments in this fashion is known as 
"condominium conversion." 
If a landlord decides to convert a rental apartment building, he 
may offer his tenants the opportunity to purchase the apartments 
they inhabit before the apartments are offered for sale to the gen-
eral public. If the tenant declines the offer, the landlord will at-
tempt to sell the unit to someone else, and if there are readily 
available buyers the non-purchasing tenant will be evicted as 
quickly as possible. If many buildings in a community are undergo-
ing the same process, the amount of available rental housing is re-
duced, and the displaced tenants have no place to move. Senator 
William Proxmire has called this dislocation "the most intractable 
of all the problems spawned by the condominium boom. "I 
This article concerns state and municipal efforts to regulate con-
dominium conversion for the protection of tenants, first discussing 
the characteristics of condominiums and their advantages and dis-
advantages to individuals and to the urban environment. Attention 
will then focus on attempts by the town of Brookline, MaSsachu-
setts, to restrict condominium conversion, and on Grace v. Town of 
1715y (1976». See Berger, Condominium: Shelter on a Statutory Foundation, 63 COLUM. L. 
REv. 987, 987-90 (1963). 
• In 1977, the most recent year for which statistics are available, approximately 723,000 
condominium units existed in the United States. BUREAU or THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T. or 
COMMERCE AND OFFICE or POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T. or HOUSING AND 
URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ANNUAL HOUSING SURVEY: 1977, pt. A at 1. 
• A list of citations to condominium statutes is found in lA P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, CON-
DOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE app-9 (1979). 
• Proxmire, Introduction, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. xi, xiv (1974). 
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Brookline,s the recent Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court deci-
sion upholding a 1978 Brookline by-law, which regulated conver-
sion.? The article will then proceed to inquire whether non-com-
pensatory government regulation of condominium conversion may 
effect a "taking" of property under the Fifth Amendment, requir-
ing the payment of compensation.' Finally, the New York state 
condominium conversion statutes· will be described as an example 
of state-wide regulation which attempts to balance the interests of 
tenants with the needs of landlords more comprehensively than is 
possible under a local, piecemeal approach. 
II. CONDOMINIUMS 
A. Policy Aspects of Condominium Conversion 
Condominium conversion is an issue involving difficult policy 
questions which must be considered before a decision can be 
reached as to whether or how conversion should be regulated. Con-
dominiums offer significant advantages to individuals and to the 
environment in which they exist, yet their promotion causes hard-
ship to others. The goal of any sound regulatory scheme is to mini-
mize the hardships while realizing the benefits of conversion. 
A major factor favoring conversion is the significant financial ad-
vantages which accrue to a condominium owner. Condominiums 
are a form of real estate and in a favorable market are a profitable 
investment.lo As an owner pays off the mortgage used to purchase 
the dwelling, he builds an increment of value above the remaining 
indebtedness. This growing increment is a financial asset, to be re-
alized on the resale of the unit or to be used as security for new 
• 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979). 
• While condominium conversion a1fects cities throughout the ·nation, each situation is 
unique because it is shaped by local politics and statutory provisions. The particular situa-
tion in Brookline is presented as one example of the context of the problem and its 
resolution. 
• The government may be found to have appropriated the use of private property by 
regulation. See text at notes 97-112 infra. 
• N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW §§ 352-ee to eeee (McKinney Supp. 1979). 
'0 A good example of a favorable real estate market may be found in Brookline, Massa-
chusetts, the Boston suburb whose experience with condominium conversion regulation is 
described in the text at notes 34-96 infra. The cost of an average home in Brookline rose 86 
percent between 1970 and 1979. HARBRIDGE HOUSE, INC., CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION IN 
BROOKLINE: AN ANALYSIS or How CONVERSIONS TAKE PLACE IN BROOKLINE, AND or How 
THEY ArFECT THE TOWN'S REsIDENTS AND ITS FISCAL CONDITION IV-14 (1979) (hereinafter 
cited as HARBRIDGE HOUSE, INC.). 
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loans. The federal government subsidizes condominium ownership, 
as it subsidizes all home ownership, by allowing the deduction of 
payments for mortgage interestll and property taxes12 from the 
calculation of taxable income. These deductions are not available 
to renters. 
The psychological value of home ownership is important as well. 
Urban areas have few single family houses, and condominiums may 
provide the only means for an individual who wishes to live in the 
city to own his own home. A survey of condominium purchasers in 
one community has concluded: "It seems clear. . . that condomin-
iums are seen by purchasers as filling one of the most basic desires 
in American society-the desire to achieve the security and stabil-
ity of home ownership."18 
Cities and towns may also benefit from condominium conversion. 
Conversion tends to increase the tax base because the units in a 
building are assessed separately at figures that aggregate far more 
than the value of the building as a rental property. I. Other benefits 
of condominium conversion cannot be measured so precisely. 
Neighborhood stability may be promoted, as residents tend to stay 
longer in units they own rather than rent. III Pride of ownership 
may lead to better maintenance of the buildings and lessen deteri-
oration of the housing stock of a city or town. One author in the 
field has concluded: "[I]t is increasingly apparent that occupier 
ownership in the form of cooperatives and condominiums offers 
the best long range solution to the problem of urban decay."!e 
11 I.R.C. § 163(a). 
11 [d. § 164(a). 
II IiARBRlDGE HOUSE, INC., supra note 10, at IV-4. 
'4 The Assessor of the Town of Brookline determined that buildings converted from 1970 
through 1976 increased 28 percent in value after conversion. The Planning Board reported 
that conversion was the only significant way to increase the tax base without constructing 
new developments. Report of the Planning Board in Record Before Brookline Special Town 
Meeting (July 25, 1978). A later study commissioned by the town found an average 34 per-
cent increase in tax assessments on converted buildings. HARBRIDGE HOUSE, INC., supra note 
10, at VII-5. 
The benefit to the community of an increased tax base from condominium ·conversion is 
not available in New York. The New York condominium statute provides, "In no event shall 
the aggregate of the assessment of the units plus their common interests exceed the total 
valuation of the property were the property assessed as a parcel." N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 
339-Y (McKinney Supp. 1979). 
11 "If conversion continues, Brookline's population, on the evidence of our sample data, 
will become significantly more a1Huent, more married, somewhat older, and less transient." 
HARBRIDGE HOUSE, INC., supra note 10, at 111-64. 
11 Rohan, The "Model Condominium Code"-A Blueprint for Modernizing Condomin-
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Government subsidy of condominiums might provide these advan-
tages to low-income families and their neighborhoods and be a via-
ble solution to the difficulties of public housing.17 
The benefits of condominium conversion must be balanced 
against formidable disadvantages. First, the very high return on in-
vestmentl8 accruing to developers causes those with sufficient capi-
tal to try to convert as many buildings as they can and to sell them 
as quickly as possible. Unscrupulous developers may therefore not 
disclose important information on the condition of the converted 
building or on financing, or may engage in high-pressure sales tac-
tics. le Second, tenants residing in the building at the time it is con-
verted may not wish to purchase their apartments because they do 
not plan to remain in the neighborhood for a long period or do not 
like their apartments enough to justify a large expenditure of 
funds. More important, tenants often simply cannot afford to 
purchase their apartments. Mortgage and property tax payments 
are significantly higher than rent on the same unit.IO While income 
tax deductions may bring the total cost within reach, the purchaser 
must make payments each month on mortgage and taxes, and not 
realize the income tax benefits of ownership until he receives a re-
fund from the Internal Revenue Service the following year. In ad-
dition, the savings resulting from an income tax deduction are less 
for taxpayers with lower incomes than for those with high in-
comes, II who can more likely afford to purchase in the first 
instance. 
These policy considerations all are present whenever a city or 
town decides to regulate condominium conversions. Before this ar-
ium Legislation, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 587, 599 (1978) reprinted in 1A P. ROHAN & M. RESKIN, 
CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 23 (1979). Professor Rohan also notes that not a single 
privately-sponsored condominium or cooperative project in New York City has defaulted on 
its real estate tax obligations at a time when the city's fiscal problems are due, in part, to a 
shrinking tax base. Id. at 599 n.63. 
17 See Teaford, Homeownership for Low-Income Families: The Condominium, 21 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 243 (1970). 
,. A study of condominium conversion in Brookline prepared for the Board of Selectmen 
found an average 20 percent profit to the developer before taxes. HARBRIDGE HOUSE, INC., 
supra note 10, at V-23 . 
.. See Barber, The Condominium Conspiracy, PLAYBOY, Nov., 1979, at 140. 
•• The average monthly carrying cost after taxes for apartments which had an average 
rent of $345 per month before conversion was $481 for a married couple filing jointly. HAft-
BRIDGE HOUSE, INC., supra note 10, at 111-64 . 
• , 1 S. SURREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 250-51 (1972). 
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ticle turns to a discussion of one community's experience with con-
dominium conversion regulation, an understanding of the legal 
structure on which condominiums are built is necessary. 
B. Condominiums in Statutes and Common Law 
When a person buys an apartment, he actually acquires two 
pieces of property joined together.1I The purchaser is the sole own-
er of the apartment itself, with the boundaries usually set by a 
description in the condominium master deed,18 and is a co-owner 
with the other purchasers of the common areas and facilities which 
comprise the rest of the property. These facilities include the hall-
ways, elevators, and plumbing and heating systems, and may in-
clude the land on which the building is situated.14 An association 
of owners, governed by its own by-laws, maintains the commonly-
owned property. The unit owners pay a fee to the association for 
this maintainence, and are liable for assessment for extraordinary 
repairs undertaken by the association. II 
This arrangement is provided for by statute in all fifty states. II 
The condominium statutes set out procedures for the creation of 
condominiums, a system for describing the units within a building, 
and provide for the continuing administration of the building by 
the association.17 The statutes also may include provisions for such 
matters as liens on individual units for overdue association fees 
II See note 1 supra. Three documents recorded at the local registry of deeds define the 
characteristics of a condominium. The first is the condominium declaration, or master deed, 
which submits the entire property to the provisions of the applicable state condominium 
statute, describes the property, and describes the units it contains. Second, there is the unit 
deed which is the instrument that conveys an individual unit to a purchaser. Finally, the by-
laws of the condominium are the rules by which the owners agree to manage the property. 
See 1 P. ROHAN & M. RBsKIN, CONDOMINJUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.02-.04 (1978). 
II See note 22 supra. The following language is from a sample condominium declaration: 
Each Unit consists of the space: 
(i) bounded by the walls, floors and ceilings of such Unit as shown on the Condomin-
ium Plat, provided, however, that the wall, floor and ceiling materials, other than the 
finished surface thereof (e.g., paint, wallcoverings), shall be Common Elements .... 
(emphasis in original). Lippman, Drafting the Condominium Declaration and Bylaws, in 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, CONVERTING RENTAL HOUSING INTO CONDOMINIUMS 39, 62 (1975) 
(Real Estate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series, No. 107) . 
.. Condominiums may be created on leased land. See 1A P. RoHAN & M. RESKIN, CONDO-
MINIUM LAw AND PRACTICE ch. 19 (1978). 
II 1 P. ROHAN & M. RBsKlN, CONDOMINJUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.03-.04 (1978). 
II See note " supra. 
If The statutes specify the required contents of the condominium declaration, the bylaws, 
and the unit deeds described in note 22 supra. 
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and assessments,18 the insurance required to be maintained for the 
common areas,18 and disposition of the property if the building is 
destroyed.80 The statutes' importance is to simplify and make 
workable this complex form of real estate ownership.81 
The characteristics of condominiums described above may be 
created without a condominium statute, using the common law es-
tates in land.81 The drafting problems are confusing, however, and 
it is easier to convey condominiums by reference to an enabling 
statute. Mortgage lenders and title insurance companies may not 
allow funds to be released for condominium purchases without the 
regularity provided by a condominium statute. 
To convey a condominium at common law would require that 
the unit be described precisely in an individual deed, with a sepa-
rate deed needed to convey the co-ownership interest in the com-
mon area. Such deeds would necessarily be quite long and expen-
sive to. produce since they could not be in a standard form, but 
would have to be different for each building. Provision would also 
have to be made for common management and other matters ordi-
narily covered by statute. aa 
It is within the context of the above legal and policy considera-
tions that cities and towns make decisions on condominium con-
version regulation. Before evaluating the constitutional limitations, 
if any, on such regulation, the power of a municipality to deal in-
dependently with condominium conversion will be examined by 
discussing in detail the history of attempted condominium conver-
sion control in Brookline, Massachusetts. 
III. EVICTION CONTROL IN BROOKLINE, MASSACHUSETTS 
The Boston metropolitan area is characterized by a large num-
ber of communities which, while starting out as distinct localities, 
have tended to merge visually as the population of the region has 
grown. Municipal boundaries, however, have not been altered and 
local governmental entities still act with considerable indepen-
"' See statutes collected at 1 P. RoHAN " M. RBSKIN, CONDOMINIUM LAW AND PRACTICE § 
6.04[2] nn.6, 20 (1979). 
H See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 34.07.400 (1975). 
10 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183A, § 17 (West 1977). 
II Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 2268, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1043 
(1979). 
uSee 4B R. POWELL, THE LAW or REAL PROPERTY 11633.8 (1977), and Cribett, supra note 
I, at 1216-18. 
U See, e.g., Berger, supra note 2, at 1015-16. 
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dence. The Town of Brookline is a good example. 
Being both convenient to downtown Boston and a desirable 
place to live, Brookline has been sharply affected by the growing 
popularity of condominiums. M Landlords who are unsatisfied with 
the regulated return on their investment in apartment buildings 
under rent control have been seeking to sell to eager condominium 
buyers. Long-time elderly8l' and low-income residents are unwilling 
or unable to purchase their units, and Brookline has responded to 
the problem by restricting evictions for condominium conversion. 
Regulation of the landlord-tenant relationship has been a persis-
tent and controversial issue in Brookline as the town has sought to 
protect its residents from unreasonable evictions and rents. While 
condominium conversion is a comparatively recent cause of tenant 
eviction, the town has regulated rents and evictions within its bor-
ders since 1969. Court decisions involving the power of the town to 
determine the permissible grounds for evictions in the rent control 
context are directly relevant to the present authority of Brookline 
to regulate evictions for condominium conversion because the same 
authority, exercised through the local rent control by-law, is used 
to regulate conversion-related evictions. Before continuing to those 
cases, a general understanding of the scope of municipal authority 
in Massachusetts is necessary. 
Prior to 1966, municipal power in Massachusetts was in accord 
with "Dillon's Rule,"8. which stated that a municipality could reg-
ulate local matters only pursuant to an express grant of authority 
from the state legislature (also known in Massachusetts as the 
.. In 1973, 100 to 150 apartments were being converted to condominiums each year out of 
approximately 11,000 apartments under rent control. In 1977, the rate of conversion had 
risen to about 500 units annually. Selectmen's Advisory Committee Recommendation in Re-
cord Before Brookline Special Town Meeting (July 25, 1978). 
I. Brookline has the highest percentage of elderly residents in the state. [d . 
.. Answer of the Justices, 356 Mass. 769, 770-71, 250 N.E.2d 450, 452 (1969) (declined to 
render advisory opinion to state legislature as to home-rule power of municipality to adopt 
rent control for want'of a "solemn occasion"). 
The following section is known as "Dillon's Rule": 
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses 
and can exercise the following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express 
words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly 
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and pur-
poses of the corporation,-not simply convenient, but indispensible. Any fair, reasonable, 
substantial doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the 
corporation, and the power is ·denied. 
1 J. Dn.LON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW or MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 237 (5th ed. 1911) 
(emphasis in original). 
1980] CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION 927 
General Court}. A court would not uphold a by-law or ordinance 
unless the municipality could show such authority to pass the 
law.87 Cities and towns were not considered an independent level 
of government, but were subordinate agencies of the state govern-
ment, administering delegated authority." General enabling legis-
lation passed by the legislature granted all the cities and towns in 
the state the authority to regulate a particular matter, while spe-
cial enabling legislation permitted one or more named municipali-
ties to assume control over a situation which affected them partic-
ularly. This close state supervision of local affairs was a heavy 
burden on the legislature. a. 
In 1966 the Massachusetts electorate approved amendment arti-
cle 89,fO which substantially modified the state's system of munici-
pal authority by establishing "home rule. "fl The stated intent of 
the amendment was to "grant and confirm to the people of every 
city and town the right of self-government in local matters 
• • • • "411 Section 6 of the amendment permitted cities and towns to 
exercise any power the General Court could confer on them so long 
as it was not inconsistent with the state constitution or the general 
laws of the state.fa This broad grant was limited to a great degree 
by section 7, which specifically excluded the power to regulate 
.7 See generally Atherton v. Selectmen of Bourne, 337 Mass. 250, 255-56, 149 N.E.2d 232, 
235 (1958) . 
.. [d . 
•• In four years surveyed, nearly 20 percent of the 15,809 bills introduced in the General 
Court were related to the affairs of cities and towns. 14 ANN. SURVEY OF MASS. LAW § 16.1, 
n.1 (1968). 
•• MASS. CONST. amend. art. 89 . 
.. Answer of the Justices, 356 Mass. 769, 770-71, 250 N.E.2d 450, 452 (1969). 
Home rule legislation is different in each state, and a survey of every jurisdiction is be-
yond the scope of this article. See 2 R. EICKHOFF & M. MEIER, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL 
CORPORATIONS BY EUGENE McQUILLIN §§ 4.28-.29, 4.82-.83, 9.08-9.08(c) (3d. ed. 1979), and 
Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power under Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 
MINN. L. REv. 643 (1964). 
The Massachusetts home rule amendment is described in detail in this article because of 
its importance in the cases discussed. See MASS. CONST. amend. art. 89. It is also representa-
tive of home rule legislation, with language taken directly from the American Municipal 
Association's Model Act. See Sandalow, supra, at 675-76 . 
•• MASS. CONST. amend. art. 89, § 1. 
•• Any city or town may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local ordinances or by-
laws, exercise any power or function which the general court has power to confer upon it, 
which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general court in 
conformity with powers reserved to the general court by section eight, and which is not 
denied, either expressly or by clear implication, to the city or town by its charter. 
MASS. CONST. amend. art. 89, § 6. 
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most elections, to tax, to borrow money, to dispose of park land, to 
enact civil law, or to define or punish a felony.44 For all other func-
tions, however, municipalities had the power to independently pass 
law unless otherwise restricted, a reversal of the old policy of not 
having the power to pass law unless authorized. 
A. Regulation of Rents and Evictions Under Home Rule 
Brookline sought to use the new power conferred by the home 
rule amendment to stabilize its rental housing market. The town's 
citizens were well aware of the demand for apartments in their 
neighborhoods and wanted to prevent displacement caused by 
landlords seeking unreasonable rents. In June, 1969, the Town 
Meeting voted to adopt a rent control by-law under the home rule 
power granted by amendment article 89.411 
A Brookline landlord brought an action to strike down the by-
law as exceeding the power of the town.46 The landlord argued that 
the power to regulate rents and evictions was withheld from cities 
and towns by the limitation imposed by section 7(5) of amendment 
article 89,"7 which prohibits a municipality from enacting civil law 
governing a civil relationship, except as incident to an independent 
municipal power.48 The town urged, that the authority over rent 
and evictions was included in the broad grant of power contained 
in section 6, which was not circumscribed in this instance by the 
limits of section 7.48 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, affirming an in-
terlocutory decree below, held in Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Re-
view & Grievance Board of BrooklinellO that the authority to regu-
late rents and evictions was not within the power of the town. The 
court used a two-part analysis: it sought first to determine if the 
by-law was a civil law governing a civil relationship, and second, if 
•• Id. § 7 . 
•• Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd. of Brookline, 357 Mass. 709, no, 
712, 260 N.E.2d 200, 202, 203 (1970) . 
•• Id. at 709, 260 N.E.2d at 200 . 
.. Nothing in this article shall be deemed to grant to any city or town the power to ... 
enact private or civil law governing civil relationships except as an incident to an exer-
cise of an independent municipal power . . . . 
MASS. CONST. amend. art. 89, § 7 . 
•• Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Bd. of Brookline, 357 Mass. 709, 712, 
260 N.E.2d 200, 205 (1970) . 
•• Id . 
•• 357 Mass. 709, 260 N.E.2d 200 (1970). 
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it was such law, whether the passage of the by-law was incident to 
an independent municipal power. The court considered the mean-
ing of section 7(5) in light of its legislative history and found that 
its language was to be construed broadly and prohibited munici-
palities from legislating on some matters, even though they were 
not included in existing state law. III Continuing to the second ques-
tion, whether the by-law was incident to the town's independent 
police power to protect the health, welfare, and safety of its citi-
zens, the court found that while some aspects of the landlord-ten-
ant relationship might be regulated by the town for health and 
safety reasons, rent control was an independent objective, and not 
part of the municipal police power.1I2 Rent control was thus not 
incident to an independent municipal power, and was a civil law 
affecting a civil relationship. The court therefore held that Brook-
line's by-law was within the prohibition of section 7(5) and that 
rents could not be regulated by a city or town absent express ena-
bling legislation from the state. liS 
B. Condominium Conversion Regulation Under the 
General Rent Control Statute 
The state legislature provid'ed the needed express enabling legis-
lation shortly after Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Griev-
ance Board of Brookline was decided, a general rent control stat-
uteIH for cities and towns with populations greater than fifty 
thousand persons, effective in individual municipalities upon ac-
ceptance by their governing bodies.1I11 The statute prohibited evic-
tions from rent-controlled units except on certain grounds set forth 
in the law. Two permissible grounds for evictions of importance to 
this discussion were: first, eviction because the landlord or his fam-
ily sought to occupy the unit, and second, eviction for a "just 
., [d. at 713-16, 260 N.E.2d at 204-05 . 
• 1 [d. at 718, 260 N.E.2d at 207 . 
•• [d. at 719-20, 260 N.E.2d at 207-08 . 
.. Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 842, 1970 Mass. Acts 732, reprinted in MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 40 app. at 249 (West Supp. 1979). 
The statute was to terminate April 1, 1975, and was extended by the Act of June 13, 1974, 
ch. 360, 1974 Mass. Acts 237, and the Act of Dec. 31, 1975, ch. 851, 1975 Mass. Acts 1233, 
until April 1, 1976 . 
•• When a statute is to take effect upon its acceptance by a city or town, the acceptance is 
made by a vote of the city council, in a city, or by a majority vote of the town meeting, in a 
town. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 4, § 4 (West Supp. 1979). 
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cause" not in conflict with the purpose of the statute. IS 
Brookline accepted rent control pursuant to this general rent 
control statute, and in August, 1972, its rent control board promul-
gated guidelines which were to be met before certificates of evic-
tion" were issued to developers for condominium conversion. 
These guidelines required: (1) the recording of a master deed; (2) a 
signed purchase and sale agreement for the unit; (3) that the ten-
ant to be evicted have had the right of first refusal to purchase; (4) 
that the sale was for the occupancy of the purchaser; and (5) that 
the purchase and sale agreement not contain repurchase or option 
provisions.1I8 An "Emergency Regulation" promulgated in January, 
1973, additionally required: 
(1) a limitation on the annual cost of the condominium; (2) a surety 
bond for management and maintainence; (3) purchase and sale agree-
ments signed for at least fifty-one percent of all units in a building; 
and (4) such 'other requirements as the Board deems necessary accord-
ing to the circumstances of a given case.'lIe 
Finally, in March, 1973, the rent control board issued a regulation 
under the general rent control statute prohibiting the issuance of 
certificates of eviction for condominium conversion.so 
The January and March, 1973, regulations were challenged by a 
developer denied certificates of eviction by the board for noncom-
pliance with the January "Emergency Regulation." The question 
in this case, Zussman v. Rent Control Board of Brookline,S1 was 
II No person shall bring any action to recover possession of a controlled rental unit un-
less: ... (8) The landlord seeks to recover possession in good faith for use and occupancy 
of himself, or his children, parents, brother, sister, father-in-law, mother-in-law, son-in-
law, or daughter-in-law ... [or) 
(10) The landlord seeks to recover possession for any other just cause, provided that his 
purpose is not in conflict with the provisions and purposes of this act. 
1970 Mass. Acts, ch. 842, § 9. See note 52 supra. 
•• A landlord seeking to recover possession of a controlled rental unit was required to 
apply for a certificate of eviction from the rent control board. A copy of the landlord's appli-
cation was to be mailed to the tenant with a notification of the tenant's rights. If the board 
found the facts in the petition to be valid and to be a permissible ground for eviction, the 
certificate would be issued. 1970 Mass. Acts, ch. 842, § 9(b). See note 54 supra. A landlord 
who attempted to evict a tenant without a certificate of eviction was liable to criminal pros-
ecution. Id. § 9(c). 
II Zussman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 367 Mass. 561, 568, 326 N.E.2d 876, 880 
(1975) . 
.. Id. 
IG Id . 
.. 367 Mass. 561, 326 N.E.2d 876 (1975). 
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whether condominium conversion constituted "just cause" for evic-
tion under the general rent control statute. If it did constitute a 
permissible reason for eviction, the Board's regulations were in 
conflict with the statute. 
The court did not confine itself to an interpretation of the words 
"just cause," but instead examined the entire rent control statute 
and found in it certain provisions that indicated an intent of the 
legislature to accomodate the need for rent control with a policy of 
encouraging home ownership.82 Because condominiums are a form 
of home ownership, the rent control board was held to have no 
authority to restrict conversion under the statute. The court rea-
soned that to allow the board that authority would frustrate the 
policy implicit in the statute. The 1973 regulations were struck 
down, and the trial court's decree ordering issuance of certificates 
of eviction was affirmed.88 
The court in Zussman construed a particular rent control stat-
ute, and the opinion should not be read to say that it is per se 
improper to restrict condominium conversion in Massachusetts or 
that prohibitions on the conversion of rent-controlled apartments 
to condominiums cannot stand. The regulations in Zussman were 
struck down only because of the policy of encouraging home own-
ership found in the general rent control statute.84 
In a jurisdiction with a rent control statute lacking provisions 
which demonstrate such an ancillary purpose, the regulation or 
bans on evictions from rent-controlled apartments might be up-
held as advancing the purpose of the statute. A special rent control 
statute for Brookline lacking the provisions fatal to the regulations 
•• These provisions stated that the renting of apartments in a cooperative and in owner-
occupied two or three family houses was exempt from rent control; that a tenant could be 
evicted if the landlord sought possession for his use or the use of a member of his family; 
and that a tenant might be evicted if he refused the landlord access for the purpose of 
showing the unit to a prospective purchaser. The court viewed the last provision as contem-
plating the sale of rental units for occupation by the purchaser. Id. at 566-67, 326 N.E.2d at 
879 . 
• a Id. at 569, 326 N.E.2d at 880. The decree is set out in full at note 3 in the opinion. 
The court did not discuss § 9(e) of the general rent control statute, which stated that the 
provisions for eviction in that section were intended as additional restrictions on the land-
lord's right to recover possession of a rental unit: landlords were not to use the "just cause" 
subsection alone as grounds for eviction. While the court did hold that condominium con-
version constituted "just cause" for eviction, this subsection may explain the emphasis on a 
broad policy analysis in the opinion . 
.. See Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 2265, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1042 
(1979). 
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in Zussman had already been passed by the state legislature,SIi and 
the town turned to this statute for authority to continue regulation 
of condominium conversion. 
C. Condominium Conversion Pursuant to the Special 
Rent Control Statute 
The special rent control statute, passed on Brookline's petitionss 
at the same time as the general rent control statute examined in 
Zussman v. Rent Control Board, provided for rent and eviction 
control in that town alone, and permitted Brookline to establish by 
by-law its own standards for regulating evictions.s7 Soon after 
Zussman was decided, the town revoked its acceptance of the gen-
eral rent control statute at a town meeting and, as of January 1, 
1976, controlled rents and evictions under the authority granted it 
by the special statute. Because of this change, the town was no 
longer bound by the policy of encouraging home ownership enunci-
ated in Zussman, although its eviction by-law at the time paral-
leled the permissible ground,S for eviction under the general rent 
control statute. 
On July 25, 1978, a town meeting amended the rent and eviction 
by-Iaw.ss The effect of the amendment was to make certificates of 
•• Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 843, 1970 Mass. Acts 740 . 
... Chapter 843 was passed in compliance with MASS. CONST. amend. art. 89, § 8. Marshal 
House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 358 Mass. 686, 697-98, 266 N.E.2d 876, 884 
(1971). (This is a different decision than the Marshal House opinion discussed in the text). 
Under section eight of the Home Rule Amendment, one of the enumerated instances in 
which the legislature has the power to enact special laws is "on petition filed or approved by 
the voters of a city or town, or the mayor and city council, or other legislative body, of a 
city, or the town meeting of a town, with respect to a law relating to that city or town 
.... " MASS. CONST. amend. art. 89, § 8(1) . 
•• The special rent control statute provided: "The town of Brookline may by by-law regu-
late the evictions of tenants .... " Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 843 § 6, 1970 Mass. Acts, 740, 
741. 
The statute's emergency preamble recited the conditions peculiar to Brookline which 
made a special law necessary: "The general court finds. . . that a serious public emergency 
exists in the town of Brookline ... which emergency has been created by housing demoli-
tion, an expanding student population, [and] a substantial elderly population .... " Id. § 1. 
... The provisions, as amended, read: 
"Section 9. Evictions. (a) No person shall bring any action to recover possession of a 
controlled rental unit unless: ... (8) the landlord seeks to recover possession in good 
faith for use and occupancy of himself or his children, parents, brother, sister, father-in-
law, mother-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-law, except that if the unit is a condo-
minium unit occupied by a tenant who was in possession thereof at the time the land-
lord acquired ownership, then the Board shall not issue a Certificate of Eviction here-
under for a period of six months from the date when the Board determines that the 
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eviction unavailable to developers for condominium conversion, 
and to make unit purchasers take title to their condominium with 
the occupant in possession if that occupant refused to vacate vol-
untarily. The purchaser was not to be issued a certificate of evic-
tion until six months after the rent control board determined that 
the facts in a petition for a certificate were true. If the board deter-
mined according to its own standards that a hardship existed for 
the tenant, the certificate of eviction could be delayed an addi-
tional six months.es 
The impediment to condominium conversion created by the 
amendments was quite limited compared to other possible meth-
ods of regulating conversion. The by-law did not affect real prop-
erty law by prohibiting the conversion of apartment buildings from 
rental to condominium properties or by forbidding the conveyance 
of individual units.70 Nor was the unit purchaser prevented from 
eventually evicting the tenant and taking possession of the unit 
after the prescribed waiting period.71 The by-law also did not pro-
hibit the purchaser, now the landlord of a single apartment, from 
seeking a rent increase under local rent control rules to provide a 
fair return on the investment and expenses associated with owning 
the condominium. Because the costs of apartment ownership are 
facts attested to in the Landlord's Petition are valid and in compliance herewith; and if 
the Board determines that a hardship exists, then the Board may extend the period 
between the determination of validity and compliance hereunder and the date for issu-
ance of the Certificate for an additional period of up to six months . ... (10) the land-
lord seeks to recover possession for any other just cause, provided that his purpose is not 
in conflict with the provisions and purposes of this act. The submission of a unit to 
Chapter 183A of the General Laws of Massachusetts [the condominium statute] shall 
not be deemed just cause hereunder." (emphasis added indicates language added pursu-
ant to amendment). 
Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 2260 n.8, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1040 (1979) 
(emphasis in original) . 
•• This arrangement has since been changed. The Town Meeting amended the rent con-
trol by-law in 1979 to prohibit issuance of certificates of eviction to recover possession from 
tenants who had been in continuous occupancy since a time prior to the recording of a 
master deed. Article 32, Warrant of Brookline Town Meeting (May 7, 1979). The 1978 by-
law amendment is described and analyzed in this article because it is the subject of the only 
case on the issue, Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 1038 
(1979), and because the conclusions reached in light of Grace apply beyond the particular 
situation in Brookline. 
An action challenging the constitutionality of the 1979 by-law amendment is pending in 
federal court. Chan v. Town of Brookline, Docket No. 80-0020-MC (D. Mass. 1980) . 
• 0 These options were not available to the town under the special rent control statute or 
any other law. 
71 This was changed by a later amendment. See note 69 supra. 
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greater than the cost of renting the same unit before conversion,7lI 
there would be grounds for a rent increase73 which could force the 
tenant to vacate. 
No statistics are available on the impact of the 1978 regulation.7• 
Individual purchasers were probably reluctant to commit the funds 
required when they could not be guaranteed possession for as long 
as a year, and persons arriving from outside the Boston area 
sought immediate shelter. Furthermore, banks did not like to 
finance these purchases.7& The Brookline by-law was potentially a 
major deterrent to the sale of converted apartments. 
Three parties brought an action to strike down the 1978 by-law 
amendments.76 They asserted that the power to regulate evictions 
granted by the special rent control statute did not give Brookline 
the power to regulate condominium conversion," and also claimed 
that the amendments constituted a "taking" of property and a de-
nial of equal protection of the laws.78 The plaintiffs relied heavily 
on Zussman v. Rent Control Board of Brookline,78 which had 
struck down the earlier condominium conversion regulations en-
acted pursuant to the general rent control statute, arguing that the 
•• See note 20 supra . 
•• Two plaintiffs who challenged the by-law amendments in Grace v. Town of Brookline, 
79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979), petitioned the rent control board for in-
creases in the authorized rents for their units. They received increases in the amount they 
sought. [d. at 2262 n.10, 399 N.E.2d at 1041. 
•• Statistics on the number of apartments converted by recording master deeds pursuant 
to the Massachusetts condominium enabling statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 183A, § 2 
(West 1977), do not reflect the impact of the by-law amendments because there is no way of 
determining (i) how many of these units were actually marketed, and (ii) of those units that 
were marketed, how many were not sold because of the law. The number of owners dis-
courged from converting at all likewise cannot be ascertained . 
•• The mortgage financing of one plaintiff in Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979) was cancelled because she was unable to occupy the unit. 
[d. at 2262, 399 N.E.2d at 1041. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had stated 
previously: "Purchasers of condominiums would be ill-advised to make full payment for a 
unit without any assurance that possession could be recovered, and financing for the trans-
action could not be expected to be available." Zussman v. Rent Control Bd. of Brookline, 
367 Mass. 561, 569, 326 N.E.2d 876, 880 (1975) . 
•• The plaintiffs were a developer, a unit purchaser whose condominium was occupied by 
a tenant who lived there prior to the sale, and a party who had signed a purchase and sale 
agreement and sold her previous residence in anticipation of occupying a condominium but 
who had lost her financing because she was unable to move into the unit. Grace v. Town of 
Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 2261-62, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1041 (1979) . 
.. [d. at 2263, 399 N.E.2d at 1042 . 
•• [d. at 2271, 399 N.E.2d at 1045. A discussion of the "taking" issue will be postponed 
un~il the Fifth Amendment has been considered in detail. See text at notes 113-21 infra . 
•• 367 Mass. 561, 326 N.E.2d 876 (1975). See text at notes 54-65 supra. 
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emphasis of that opinion was not on the differences between the 
two rent control statutes, but on the provision for the condomin-
ium concept in the Massachusetts General Laws and the public 
need for home ownership.so The plaintiffs urged that Brookline not 
be allowed to frustrate state policy similarly with restrictions on 
condominium conversion under another rent control statute. 
The defendantsS1 pointed out the differences between the gen-
eral rent control statute which was the authority for the regula-
tions struck down in Zussman, and the broad language of the spe-
cial rent control statute. Brookline had special problems,82 the 
town argued, and the legislature had given it the power to deal 
with those problems as it saw fit.s3 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, in Grace v. Town of 
Brookline,u upheld the by-law amendments, distinguishing Zuss-
man because the regulations had been struck down in that case 
because "the [Rent Control] Board had accorded insufficient recog-
nition to the policy, implicit in c. 842 [the general rent control 
statute], of encouraging home ownership."slI The court reiterated 
the difference between the two statutes and its conclusion in an 
earlier decision that the statutes, passed at the same time, evi-
denced the legislature's realization that a unique problem existed 
in Brookline.s8 It therefore declined to read the general statute's 
accomodation to a policy of encouraging home ownership into the 
•• While there were certain nuances of Chapter 842 [the general rent control statute] 
which the Court discussed in reaching its conclusions [in Zussman], the real emphasis of 
the opinion was on the fact that the condominium concept had been specifically pro-
vided for by the legislature in Chapter 183A, and that condominiums offered city dwell-
ers significant advantages over rental housing and could be well suited to the housing 
problems of low income families. 
Brief for Plaintiffs at 10, Grace v.Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 
1038 (1979) . 
• , The defendants were the town, the rent control board and the Attorney General as 
defendant-intervener. Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 2257 n.2, 399 
N.E.2d 1038, 1038. The Attorney General was allowed to intervene because the by-law as 
amended had been approved by him pursuant to Massachusetts General Law ch. 40, § 32. 
[d. at 2258 n.3, 399 N.E.2d at 1039. That statute requires town by-laws to be submitted to 
the Attorney General for approval before they take effect. 
•• See note 67 supra . 
•• Brief for Defendants at 24-25, Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 
N.E.2d 1038 (1979) . 
.. 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979) . 
.. [d. at 2265, 399 N.E.2d at 1042 . 
.. [d. at 2266 n.14, 399 N.E.2d at 1043, quoting Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Bd. 
of Brookline, 358 Mass. 686, 699, 266 N.E.2d 876, 885 (1971). 
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special statute.87 The court found that the by-law amendments 
furthered the purposes of the special rent control statute-the con-
trol of abnormally high rents and the maintainence of a rental 
housing market.88 The justices observed that the by-law amend-
ments fairly accomodated the interests of building owners and con-
dominium purchasers by continuing to permit conversion, while al-
lowing the new owners a reasonable return as landlords.89 Further, 
they noted that conversion was not impeded at all if the tenant 
chose to buy the unit or vacate voluntarily. 90 
While the opinion in Grace v. Town of Brookline upheld a mu-
nicipal regulation of condominium conversion, it would be inaccu-
rate to cite the case as generally upholding municipal power to reg-
ulate condominiums as a form of ownership. Brookline had the 
benefit of special enabling legislation from the state. In deciding 
whether there is a general municipal power to regulate condomini-
ums, it would be more appropriate to look to the situation in Mar-
shal House, Inc. v. Rent Review and Grievance Bd. of Brookline,91 
in which the Massachusetts court held that there was no indepen-
dent power under the home rule amendments to the Massachu-
setts constitution to regulate rents or affect landlord-tenant law.92 
There was no enabling legislation to support the rent control by-
law in that instance, and using the reasoning of Marshal House it 
appears that the power to regulate condominium conversion is not 
within the municipal police power in Massachusetts and in other 
states with similar home rule legislation.93 
87 Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 2266, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1043 
(1979) . 
.. [d. at 2266-67, 399 N.E.2d at 1043 . 
•• [d. at 2267, 399 N.E.2d at 1043 . 
... [d. With regard to the Massachusetts condominium statute, the court found no legisla-
tive policy within the statute either favoring or disfavoring condominium conversion. The 
purpose of the statute was to clarify the condominium's legal status in Massachusetts-see 
text at notes 26-31 supra-and not to grant this form of ownership a special status. 
The court reasoned that the current rate of condominium conversion was not foreseen 
when the condominium statute was enacted in 1963. Special legislation, such as the special 
rent control statute for Brookline, was the response to condominium conversion. Grace v. 
Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 2268 n.16, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1044 (1979) . 
• , 357 Mass. 709, 260 N.E.2d 200 (1970). 
•• See text at notes 46-53 supra . 
• s Nor may condominium conversion be regulated under the zoning power, because zoning 
regulates use of land, not form of ownership. Many jurisdictions have adopted the "look-
alike" rule by case or statute; under this rule, if a particular use, such as multi-family dwell-
ings, is permitted, that use must be allowed regardless of the form of ownership. In other 
words, if the building looks like a permitted rental apartment building, the fact that it is 
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This is a fortunate result because complete freedom for munici-
palities to regulate condominium conversion would not be desira-
ble as a matter of policy. Municipal efforts to control condominium 
conversion have not followed any consistent pattern, and uncer-
tainty as to a particular community's regulatory scheme might well 
impair investment.9• Condominium conversion regulation is more 
appropriately formulated at the state level, resulting in a consis-
tent law, not a patchwork of irregular local ordinances. For this 
reason, the Uniform Condominium Act forbids discrimination by 
municipalities against the condominium form of ownership.91i A 
Model Condominium Code developed by a prominent author in 
the condominium field also forbids local regulation of 
condominiums.96 
The next problem to be addressed, then, is ascertaining the lim-
its on the power of state government to regulate condominium con-
version. The primary issue is whether a particular law regulates 
the use of private property in the public interest, or whether it 
effectively appropriates the property in question for a public 
purpose. 
owned as condominiums will not make it susceptible to additional regulation under the zon-
ing power. See Note, Condominiums and Zoning, 48 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 957 (1974), and 
Annot., 71 A.L.R.3d 866 (1976). 
The look-alike rule is sometimes found in the state condominium statute itself. For exam-
ple, the Florida Condominium Act provides: 
All laws, ordinances, and regulations concerning buildings or zoning shall be construed 
and applied with reference to the nature and use of such property, without regard to the 
form of ownership. No law, ordinance, or regulation shall establish any requirement con-
cerning the use, location, placement, or construction of buildings or other improvements 
which are, or may thereafter be, subjected to the condominium form of ownership, unless 
such requirement shall be equally applicable to all buildings and improvements of the 
same kind not then, or thereafter to be, subjected to the condominium form of 
ownership. 
FLA. STAT. § 718.507 (Supp. 1978). The relationship between condominium legislation and 
zoning in each state is analyzed in 4B R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY ~ 633.32 
(1974). 
Form of ownership may affect use, however, and if the new use is not permitted, regula-
tion by form of ownership may then be allowed. In Goldman v. Town of Dennis, 78 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1236, 375 N.E.2d 1212 (1978), the court held that conversion of a cottage colony to 
condominiums was a change from summer vacation use to year round residential use, which 
the zoning board of appeals had the power to regulate . 
.. See Rohan, supra note 16, at 591, and 4B R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY ~ 
633.34(7)(a)(iii) (1978) . 
•• Uniform Condominium Act § 1-106. See Jackson & Colgan, The Uniform Condomin-
ium Act from a Local Government Perspective, 10 URB. LAW. 429, 435 (1978) . 
.. Rohan, supra note 16, at 578. 
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IV. FIFTH AMENDMENT LIMITS ON STATE REGULATION OF 
CONDOMINIUM CONVERSION 
This section will discuss the restrictions on state legislation with 
respect to condominium conversion imposed by the Fifth Amend-
ment of the United States Constitution.97 It will first set out the 
factors that are considered in determining whether a particular 
government regulation acts as a taking of property, and then apply 
those factors to the Brookline by-law upheld in Grace and to a 
hypothetical complete ban on condominium conversion to deter-
mine the limits on state power to legislate on the issue. 
A. Limitations on Governmental Regulation of Property 
When the government restricts the use of privately owned prop-
erty, one of two powers is being exercised: the police power to pro-
tect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens,98 or the eminent 
domain power, the traditional authority of the sovereign to appro-
priate private land for public use.99 No clear test exists for deter-
mining when a particular governmental act is an exercise of the 
police power or the power of eminent domain. That the two powers 
be distinguished is crucial because of the constitutional require-
ment of payment of compensation to the owner of property taken 
by eminent domain/oo and the non-compensatory nature of an ex-
ercise of the police power for the public benefit.lol 
Unfortunately, the recent United States Supreme Court deci-
sions on the "taking" issue have been "essentially ad hoc, factual 
inquiries"lo2 in which the Court has considered the benefit to the 
•• "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. 
CONST. amend. V. The requirement of compensation for a taking of property by the govern-
ment was applied to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment in Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) . 
.. "The term 'police power' has no exact definition. . . . In its best known and most 
traditional uses, the police power is employed to protect the health, safety, and morals of 
the community .... " Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 36 n.6 (1964) . 
.. "The power of eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty, and inheres in every 
independent State." Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472, 480 (1924). 
,.. "The Fifth Amendment's guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a pub-
lic use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from forcing some peo-
ple alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the 
public as a whole." Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
,., Nor may the power of eminent domain be exercised for a private purpose. Missouri 
Pac. Ry. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896). 
, •• Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
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public of the government regulation in question, and the detriment 
suffered by the regulated party. If the private owner has not been 
deprived of all reasonable use of his property, the regulations gen-
erally have been found to be within the police power. lOS The Court 
has not established any standard test to make this determina-
tion.l04 The latest "taking" case decided by the Supreme Court, 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York/oil did set 
out some of the factors used in making such decisions. These fac-
tors will provide some guidance in assessing whether government 
regulation of condominium conversion might ever be held to be a 
"taking." 
The first consideration in Penn Central, where the Court held 
that rejection by a city commission of a plan to erect an office 
building above Grand Central Terminal did not constitute a "tak-
ing," was the economic impact of the government regulation on the 
claimant. The Court noted that it had long realized that govern-
ment could not function if it had to pay compensation for every 
change in the general law which affected private property,!" and 
that the government must be permitted the freedom to regulate 
property in a way that diminishes its value even if the regulation 
deprives the owner of the property's most beneficial use. 107 
Part of the inquiry into the economic impact of the governmen-
tal action on a particular claimant was whether the action inter-
fered "with interests that were sufficiently bound up with the rea-
sonable expectations of the claimant to constitute 'property' for 
Fifth Amendment purposes."108 Such interests were required to be 
"distinct, investment-backed expectations,"109 not merely vague 
speculations on possible future uses of the affected property. This 
is an important question because "taking" analysis is not necessary 
if the regulation does not interfere with a legitimate property in-
108 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1978). 
104 "[TJhis Court, quite simply, has been unable to develop any 'set formula' for deter-
mining when 'justice and fairness' require that economic injuries caused by public action be 
compensated by the government, rather than remain disproportionately concentrated on a 
few persons." Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
106 438 U.S. 104 (1978). For a detailed analysis of this case, see Scott, Alas in Wonder-
land: The Impact of Penn Central v. New York upon Historic Preservation Law and Pol-
icy, 7 B.C. ENV. AFF. L. REV. 317 (1979). 
108 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
107 Id. at 125. 
108 Id. 
10. Id. at 124. 
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terest because the claimant then has no right to compensation. 
The second factor considered by the Court in Penn Central to 
determine whether a governmental action constituted a compensa-
ble "taking" of property was the nature of the measure. A physical 
invasion of the property caused by the government, such as the 
flooding of land behind a dam, would be a "taking" in most cir-
cumstances.110 On the other hand, a social program "adjusting the 
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common 
good" was less likely to be so characterized.lll Land use restric-
tions were cited by the Court as an example of the latter kind of 
program which would not be deemed a "taking," even though such 
regulation caused a lessening of the property's value.ll2 
B. Condominium Conversion Regulation as a "Taking" of 
Property 
The plaintiffs in Grace v. Town of Brookline,1lS apparently con-
ceded that government might lawfully regulate the use of property 
without effecting a "taking." In light of the many decisions con-
firming land use regulation under the police power/ l4 this was not 
a startling concession. The plaintiffs argued, however, that the 
town had chosen to permit a particular use, multi-unit dwellings, 
and by its amended rent control by-law was determining who, as 
between the owner and the tenant, was to enjoy the permitted resi-
dential use. The withholding of the right of the owner to possess 
the property, they concluded, was an appropriation of the property 
for a public purpose. 111 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed that the right 
to occupy the property was denied to the plaintiff owner.llS It 
would not, however, distinguish this denial from the redistribution 
of rights in any property subject to rent control. The court drew 
upon state and federal court decisions which have long held that 
rent control is a permissible exercise of the police power, and not a 
"Old. 
111 Id. 
III Id. at 125 . 
.. s 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979). See text at notes 84·90 supra. 
'1< See, e.g., Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), Village of Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 237 U.S. 394 (1915) . 
... Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 2271, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1045 
(1979). 
"old. at 2272·73, 399 N.E.2d at 1045. 
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"taking."1l7 The court found that the by-law amendments did not 
exceed those other forms of regulation, previously declared consti-
tutional, designed to ease the housing shortage. Therefore, the 
court did not take its analysis further to determine what degree of 
state regulation would amount to a "taking."us 
In reaching its conclusion, the court indicated that it was quite 
aware that the plaintiffs' properties were not rendered worthless 
by the town's actions, citing the landlord/purchaser's right to re-
ceive a fair rent. ll9 Perhaps the plaintiff developer could have 
made out a stronger case by arguing that the diminuton of the 
value of the property, one of the tests used to determine when a 
"taking" has occurred,120 should not be measured by the return on 
his investment through rent, but by the decrease in the market 
value of the building as a whole caused by the regulation. This 
would surely not have led to a different result, but would have 
caused the court to treat the "taking" argument more fully.l2l 
The court in Grace dealt with a limited impediment to condo-
minium conversion. Could condominium conversion regulation 
ever amount to a "taking" of the property of the rental landlord? 
To speculate on this question, an extreme case is hypothesized: a 
state government, citing a housing emergency within its borders, 
bans all condominium conversion or authorizes municipalities to 
do SO.122 A landlord brings an action claiming that he has been de-
117 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156-58 (1921) (wartime regulation), Bowles v. Willing-
ham, 321 U.S. 503,516-519 (1944) (same), Teeval Co. v. Stern, 301 N.Y. 346,362,93 N.E.2d 
884, 890, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 876 (1950) (state rent control is not an arbitrary use of the 
police power, even though occasionally it may compel an owner to operate at a loss). 
"8 Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 2273, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1046 
(1979). 
"0 [d. at 2273-74, 399 N.E.2d at 1046. See text at notes 68-69 supra . 
... See text at notes 106-08 supra. 
111 The Supreme Judicial Court treated plaintiffs' equal protection argument summarily. 
While classification by form of ownership is not rationally related to regulation of use, as 
was discussed at note 93, supra, with respect to zoning, the court agreed with the town that 
the amendments advanced the purposes of rent and eviction control. Presumably, these pur-
poses are to remedy the conditions of the housing emergency stated in the special rent con-
trol statute-Ua substantial and increasing shortage of rental housing accomodations and 
... abnormally high rents." Act of Aug. 31, 1970, ch. 843 § 1, 1970 Mass. Acts 740, 740. The 
"rational relationship" standard was accepted as the appropriate level of scrutiny, and the 
court found that Brookline could rationally find that condominium conversion posed a sin-
gular threat to rent and eviction control. Grace v. Town of Brookline, 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
2257, 2275, 399 N.E.2d 1038, 1047 (1979) . 
.. I The ban would prohibit conversion of rental apartments to condominiums, not simply 
regulate eviction for condominium conversions. 
The case is not so hypothetical. The state legislature granted Newton, Massachusetts, the 
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prived of the full use of his apartment buildings without any 
compensation. 
According to Penn Central, the first factor to be considered is 
the economic impact of the ban on the claimant. A court would 
probably find the loss caused by the ban insufficient to hold that a 
"taking" had been effected. The landlord continued to receive rent, 
which even under rent control is set at an administratively-deter-
mined fair return on the investment in the building.123 Sale of the 
building as a rental property is not restricted. The fact that condo-
minium conversion would return a larger and more immediate 
profit would not in itself cause a finding of a "taking." Penn Cen-
tral reaffirmed an earlier holding that deprivation of the most ben-
eficial use of a particular property does not take a regulation out of 
the realm of the non-compensatory police power.124 
An alternative inquiry might be whether the denial to the land-
lord of the power to convert the rental apartments to condomini-
ums constituted an unreasonable interference with "distinct, in-
vestment-backed expectations."I211 An argument based on an 
expectancy of the right to convert apartments into condominiums 
would be hard to maintain because, like any other form of owner-
ship, the legal characteristics of condominiums are subject to pro-
spective modification by the state legislature. A repeal of the con-
dominium statute, for example, would effectively operate as a ban 
on condominiums,118 and the legislature could abolish common law 
condominiums just as some states have modified other forms of co-
ownership of land.117 These considerations make a denial of expec-
tation argument unlikely to prevail. 
The second factor discussed in Penn Central for determining 
whether a governmental action constitutes a "taking" of property 
power to prohibit conversions unless a special permit had been obtained from the board of 
aldermen. Act of Aug. 14, 1974, ch. 847, 1974 Mass. Acts 961. The city did not accept the 
law within the specified time. 
, •• But see Niles v. Boston Rent Control Adm'r, 78 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 240, 374 N.E.2d 
296 (1978) (holding that the requirement of the general rent control statute that rent be set 
to yield landlords a "fair net operating income" does not require a fair return on the current 
market value of the property). 
'14 Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 125 (1979), citing Gold-
blatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962). 
, •• Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
, .. For a discussion of the difficulties in establishing condominiums at common law, see 
text at notes 30-31 supra. 
, •• For example, joint tenancies have been abolished or modified in some states. C. Moy-
NIHAN, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 218 (1962). 
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is the nature of the action. The ban on condominium conversion is 
a matter of regulation; it involves no physical invasion of the prop-
erty. Rather, it is a social program to promote the common good. 
Court decisions concerning rent control have long recognized a le-
gitimate governmental interest in the maintainence of a rental 
housing market and have approved the power of the government to 
intervene in legislatively declared emergencies to control that 
market. 128 
On the basis of these considerations, it is extremely unlikely that 
a complete ban on condominium conversion would be judged to be 
a "taking" of property under the Fifth Amendment. With this re-
sult, regulation of condominium conversion short of a ban, such as 
Brookline's waiting period before involuntary eviction is allowed, 
appears to be well within the limits of the police power. 
The comparison in Grace of the effect of the Brookline by-law 
amendments to the effect of rent control was the correct analysis 
not only for a condominium conversion regulation grounded in rent 
control, but for any condominium conversion regulation or ban. 
Absent an extreme diminution of the value of the affected property 
due to the regulation, the regulation would be viewed as a social 
program benefiting society at large while not placing an undue bur-
den on anyone party. Both the purpose of the conversion regula-
tion and the degree to which it intrudes into the sphere of private 
property are similar to rent control, which has been uniformly up-
held by the courts. 
A comprehensive state statute controlling the circumstances 
under which condominium conversion is permitted provides sub-
stantial security from unfair eviction for those citizens who rent 
apartments and allows society to realize most of the benefits of 
condominium conversion. This section has demonstrated that such 
regulation, more productive and less restrictive than a total ban, is 
constitutional. The New York statutes governing condominium 
conversion provide an excellent example of such well-drafted and 
beneficial legislation. 
V. AN EXAMPLE OF STATE REGULATION: NEW YORK 
New York has addressed the problem of condominium conver-
sion in a more comprehensive manner than has Brookline, Massa-
chusetts. The state condominium conversion statute is presented 
II. See cases cited at note 117 supra. 
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to demonstrate the detailed, balanced approach available to cor-
rect the injustices caused by condominium conversion. Uti New 
York controls condominium conversion through it securities regu-
lation, or "blue sky" law.130 Unlike rent control statutes, this law is 
not nominally a stop-gap, emergency measure. The statute specifi-
cally applicable to condominium conversion in three counties 
outside New York City is particularly interesting. l3l 
The statute provides the developer with the option of choosing 
an "eviction plan" or a "non-eviction plan" of conversion. Under 
the non-eviction plan, apartments are occupied by the new owners 
as they are voluntarily vacated by the tenants in possession. The 
whole building is converted at once by recording the required dec-
laration,132 but the developer remains as landlord of the unvacated 
apartments and of the unsold units until the occupants of those 
units choose to relinquish their apartments. For this indefinite pe-
... N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352 (McKinney Supp. 1979), especially: 
§ 352-ee, "Conversion of non-residential property to residential cooperative or condomin-
ium ownership;" § 352-eee, "Conversions to cooperative or condominium ownership" (appli-
cable in the counties of Nassau, Westchester, and Rockland, upon acceptance by individual 
municipalities); and § 352-eeee, "Conversions to cooperative or condominium ownership in 
the City of New York." 
130 Condominium sales, including conversions, are governed by the New York securities 
regulation law. Whalen v. Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d 75, 78, 324 N.E.2d 536, 538, 365 N.Y.S.2d 
150, 153 (1975). An "offering statement" must be filed by the participants in the venture 
with the Department of Law. The statement is open for public inspection and contains a 
complete disclosure of the assets of the principals and the terms of their agreements. No 
"offer, advertisement or sale" may be made until the Attorney General has issued a letter 
declaring that the statement has been filed. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-e(2) (McKinney 
Supp. 1979). 
Sections of the law provide for certain statements to be made in the offering statements 
for condominium conversions. The statements are made for informational purposes only, 
and the Attorney General is not required to investigate their truthfulness, but may do so at 
his discretion. Whalen v. Lefkowitz, 36 N.Y.2d 75, 79, 324 N.E.2d 536, 538-39, 365 N.Y.S.2d 
150, 153-54 (1975). However, the statute requires the statements to be true, N.Y. GEN. Bus. 
LAW § 352-e(1)(b) (McKiI\lley 1968), so the law has the effect of compelling certain conduct 
in condominium conversion projects, as discussed in the text at notes 134 and 136 infra. 
The securities regulation laws provide strong sanctions for their violation. The Attorney 
General may seek a permanent injunction to prevent the offeror from selling securities in 
New York, or from continuing a specific offering. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-i (McKinney 
Supp. 1979). He may also seek restitution for money obtained through a fraudulent practice 
violating the statute. [d., § 353(3). The Attorney General also may prosecute criminal of-
fenses related to the fraudulent practices. [d., § 358. 
131 [d. § 352-eee (applies to Nassau, Westchester and Rockland counties) . 
.. I A property is subject to the condominium statute when a condominium declaration is 
executed and recorded. N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-f (McKinney Supp. 1979). The required 
contents of the declaration are set out in N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-n (McKinney Supp. 
1979). 
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riod, a single building will have both condominium owners and 
rental tenants as residents. 
When the eviction plan is chosen, the developer must declare in 
the offering statement133 that non-controlled rents will not be un-
conscionably increased.134 Nor may the developer commence evic-
tion proceedings "for failure to purchase or any other reason appli-
cable to expiration of tenancy," although such an action may be 
brought for failure to pay rent or for some other breach of the 
landlord -tenant relationship.136 
If the plan is declared in the offering statement to be an "evic-
tion plan," more stringent regulations apply. As with a non-evic-
tion plan, the whole building is converted at once by recording the 
proper documents. The eviction plan must provide that evictions 
for non-purchasing tenants will not commence for two years (com-
pared to the six to twelve month delay in Brookline), and that te-
nants over sixty-two years of age on the date the plan is declared 
effective by the Attorney General shall not be evicted at all.138 The 
plan must also provide that there will be no unconscionable rent 
increases during the waiting period.137 
Another important feature of this comprehensive law prevents 
"warehousing" by the developer, the accumulation of vacant apart-
ments for the purpose of conversion. The statute requires the At-
torney General to find that "an excessive number of long-term va-
cancies did not exist" when the offering statement was first 
submitted.138 This provision ensures that developers will not evict 
tenants before filing an offering statement to avoid the restriction 
placed on evictions by the statute. 
Lastly, the condominium conversion statute provides for the ten-
ant harassed by the developer. If a tenant is substantially dis-
turbed, he can request an investigation by the Attorney General. If 
the alleged conduct is found to exist, the Attorney General may 
apply for a court order restraining the sale of the unit.139 
.. 3 See note 130 supra . 
.. < The sanctions for an untrue statement are described in note 130, supra. 
130 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 352-eee(2)(c)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979) . 
.. 8 Id. § 352-eee(2)(d)(1). 
"7 Id. 
"8 Id. § 352-eee(2)(g). "Excessive vacancies" is defined as greater than 10%, unless the 
average vacancy rate has been higher for more than two years. "Long-term vacancy" is de-
fined as longer than five months. Id . 
.. 8 Id. § 352-eee(4). 
, 
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This recent statute140 serves as an example of some of the 
problems related to condominium conversion that can be provided 
for by statute. Similar provisions could be added to a condomin-
ium statute or to a rent control law. Nor is there anything to pre-
vent a municipality with appropriate enabling legislation from 
making similar detailed provisions apply within its jurisdiction. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Condominium conversion offers multiple advantages to individ-
ual buyers and sellers of condominiums and to the communities in 
which the converted buildings are located. However, the plight of 
the tenants evicted from rental apartments for conversion is a ma-
jor problem which government has tried to resolve equitably. 
Brookline, Massachusetts, responded to this concern by seeking 
to restrict evictions from rent-controlled apartments for the pur-
pose of condominium conversion. The cases arising from Brook-
line's attempts to regulate the landlord-tenant relationship, culmi-
nating in Grace v. Town of Brookline,141 reveal the limits on 
governmental power to meet the problem. Municipalities do not, in 
most jurisdictions, have the power to regulate conversion or evic-
tion, without enabling legislation from the state. States do have 
the power to regulate conversions and evictions and may exercise it 
directly, as in New York, or may authorize municipalities to ad-
dress the issue as they deem proper, as is the situation in 
Massachusetts. 
Such regulation by the state is not a "taking" of property requir-
ing the payment of compensation under the Fifth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. Application of the factors set out 
in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New ¥ork1• a to de-
termine when government regulation of private property consti-
tutes a "taking" demonstrates that condominium conversion regu-
lation, even to the extreme of a complete ban on condominium 
conversion, remains well within the bounds of government regula-
tion which has already been held not to be a "taking." 
.... The effective date was July 24, 1978. Act of July 24, 1978, ch. 544, § 5, 1978 N.Y. Laws 
962,967 . 
.. , 79 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2257, 399 N.E.2d 1038 (1979) . 
... 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
